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Its Historical Lessons and Future Society**

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cover photo Prague Spring

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Helsinki demonstration against the invasion of Czechoslovakia



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
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What was Soviet and East European Socialism: Its Historical Lessons and Future Society

Yoji Koyama¹

Introduction

At the end of December 2021 I published a Japanese book titled *What was Soviet and East European Socialism: Its Historical Lessons and Future Society* (published by Logos in Tokyo, 224p) (**the diagram below**). This is a book aiming to elucidate the emergence of Stalinism and other problems such the Prague Spring and the Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, ethnic conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and the disintegration of the Yugoslav Federation from a perspective of International Relations and Comparative Economic System. The book also explores historical lessons of socialism which existed in these areas and considers the future society. In the book words “socialism” and “communism” are used in the same meaning. The following is an English summary of the book². I would like to add that Chapter 5, albeit a rather short chapter, is described more in detail.



Chapter 1 A Turning Point in the Construction of the Soviet Socialism: the Emergence of Stalinism.

Bolsheviks led by Vladimir Lenin were obliged to construct socialism in a country where economic,

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² Chapter 1 is composed of a part of my paper that I published in 1978. Chapter 4 is a paper that I wrote on the 50th anniversary of the Prague Spring and Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia. Chapters 5 and 6 were written by reorganization of papers that I have already published. Chapters 2 and 7 were newly written. Chapter 1 has 43 pages and Chapter 4 has 53 pages. The remaining chapters are rather short (Chapters 2, 3, 5, 6 and 7 have 14 pages, 22 pages, 18 pages, 19 pages and 11 pages respectively).

social and cultural conditions necessary for socialism lacked. The most crucial year was 1929 when the grain procurement crisis occurred which was not merely an economic affair, but also a politically significant affair that threatened to shake the regime. Despite opposition by Bukharin with whom Stalin tied up till then, Stalin launched 'the revolution from above', i.e. collectivization of agriculture accompanied by the liquidation (meaning extinction) of Kulaks (rich peasants).

According to Bukharin, Russia's "small people" – craftsmen, small merchant, small industrialists, and small agricultural producers – as well as cooperative and governmental small scale enterprises and services, were not only indispensable but also complementary to industrialization, capable of mitigating current and future tensions generated by the investment effort that was largely directed toward large-scale projects. The neglect, or destruction, of such sectors would deprive the state of useful devices and possibilities for economic maneuvering in a period of strain, and, instead, would lead to the exacerbation of conflicts and crisis. The premature elimination of "the small people", and their replacement by "chinovnik"(petty officials) would beget a swollen, costly, and ineffective apparatus, and this, in turn, set in motion in its own, self-sustaining dynamism. Thinking like this, he emphasized "the reduction of state to minimum" (*An Economist's Memoire*).

However, in Bukharin's eyes, the party leadership was embarking in 1928 on a course that could not be implemented without mass terror. Bukharin, who thought that predominantly oppressive administrative methods could only lead to the creation of an oppressive system, accused the leadership of installing a system of military feudal exploitation of the peasantry. Against a creeping "Leviathan", he proposed to achieve the "commune state" and stressed the necessity of less centralization, more party democracy, more rationality and scientific approach to problems, no mass coercion, less reliance on strictly administrative state measures priority to gradualism and persuasion.

According to Barsov's study, funds necessary for rapid industrialization with priority given to heavy industry were squeezed out through non-equivalent exchange between industry and agriculture. However, in spite of extraordinarily high rate of accumulation in 1931 and 1932, industry was not able to attain appropriate growth for it, causing widespread famine in rural areas and a decline in the consumption level

"The great turn" in 1929, investment excessively inclined to heavy industry and the enforcement of collectivization of agriculture from above threw the total Soviet society into a crisis. Thus the regime of suppression became firmly fixed in Soviet socialism. The situation such as fusion, and adhesion, an unification of the Party and the State, in other words, "etatization of the Party" was completed in the political sphere. The Soviet society which had been remodeled in the 1930s was a unique socialism carved out the above-mentioned traits. Particular and erroneous experiences of the Soviet Union during the period of the first five-year plan were universalized, and the method of industrialization with priority given to the first section (section producing means of production) was enhanced to "a law". After the Second World War this was imposed to East European countries.

Chapter 2 Spatial Enlargement of the Soviet-Style Socialism

In order to understand the emergence of socialism in Eastern Europe, it is necessary to consider the Second World War and German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact. Based on Takashi Saito (1965) and Haruko Saito (1995), this problem is explained. After having gained power in January 1933, Adolf Hitler not only proposed the recovery of lost territory but also showed a burning ambition to expand the territory explicitly. The Soviet Union appealed British and French governments to form encirclement of Germany, but it was neglected. As the intention of British and French leaders was to turn Hitler's attention eastward and make Nazis Germany and the Soviet Union fight against each other and fall together, they continued to adopt appeasement policies toward Nazis Germany. At the summit talk of Adolf Hitler (Germany), Arthur Neville Chamberlain (British Empire), Edouard Daladier (France) and Benito Mussolini (Italy) held in Munich in the end of September 1938 supreme leaders of the British Empire, France and Italy accepted the request by Hitler who insisted the cession of Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia. Hitler's burning ambition to expand the territory did not cease with this. He dismantled Czechoslovakia and made Slovakia a puppet country, putting Bohemia and Moravia under the control of Germany. Then he moved on to the recovery of lost territory in the East. In March 1939 Nazis Germany captured Klaipeda (called Memel in Germany), an important port city in the Baltic coast, from Lithuania. The next target was Danzig (called Gdansk in Polish) in Poland.

Pressed by rising anti-German public opinion, the British government was obliged to show an attitude opposing Germany's aggression, giving the security to Poland, Romania and Greece from March to April in the same year. However, actions by the British government were very slow. On May 3, 1939 Soviet people's commissar for foreign affairs Maxim Litvinov, who pursued the collective security so far, was dismissed from his post, and Prime Minister Vyacheslav Molotov came to hold this post concurrently. The personnel changes meant a turn in the Soviet foreign policy.

"Germany was afraid of division of its military power into two parts by simultaneous military aid actions by the UK-France and the Soviet Union when it would attack Poland. Anyway, it was an inevitable condition for Germany to avoid two frontal operations when it would attack Poland. For that purpose Germany had to get guarantee not to intervene by bringing either the UK-France or the Soviet Union to its side" (Saito, 1995, p. 208). As early as July 4 the German government sent an unofficial letter saying "Let us divide Poland together".

Since late July the Soviet Union began to deal with "a two-horses carriage" consisting of the UK-France and Germany (Saito, 1995, p. 207). Nazis Germany made a quick approach to the Soviet Union. On August 23 German foreign minister Ribbentrop visited Moscow. He negotiated with Molotov and concluded German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact (Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact) with Molotov. The news on the talks by the foreign ministers and the conclusion of the pact sent shock waves through the world. I would like to add that since that time there had been a rumor that the pact had a secret protocol and that its whole text was revealed after the Second World War. On September 1, a week later of the conclusion of the pact, Nazis Germany invaded Poland and put this country under its

control. The Soviet army also invaded Poland on September 17.

The Baltic States came to be under the rule of the Russian Empire in the 18th century, but thanks to the collapse of the Empire these countries became independent in 1918. The Baltic States were recognized first by the Soviet Union in 1920. The interwar period was the golden era for these countries, but it did not last for so long time. By threatening them militarily, the Soviet Union made them conclude agreements which would accept the Soviet Army's stationing in September 1939, and then in October it advanced its army to these countries. In August 1940 the Soviet Union gave pressure on parliaments in these countries to adopt resolutions which should apply for their countries' admission to the Soviet Union. It meant de facto annexation of the Baltic States by the Soviet Union. Afterwards the system of the Soviet-style socialism was imposed on these countries. The nationalization of enterprises was also implemented. The removal of leading strata in these countries was carried out.

Germany suddenly declared war on the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941 and invaded it. As many Balts had bitter experiences (murder or deportation of their family members and friends) after the incorporation of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union, they "naively hoped that Germany would restore the independence of their countries or at least rescind the Bolshevik nationalization decrees" (Svabe, 1943). However, their hopes were disappointed. With the Red Army's victory in the battle of Stalingrad in February 1943 as a turning point the Soviet Union rallied back. After expulsion of the Germany army, the rule of the Baltic States by the Soviet Union resumed, and forced collectivization of agriculture was carried out there. Peasants who were regarded Kulaks as well as their family members were deported to Siberia.

Chapter 3 Situations in East European Socialism

The war in Europe ended with the defeat of Italy (in September 1943) and Germany (in May 1945). When we view Eastern Europe after the Second World War it is necessary for us to take into consideration the newly formed international framework. In October 1944 the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill met Stalin in Moscow, discussing the sphere of influence after the war. They agreed as follows: As for Yugoslavia and Hungary both sides have influence on the basis of fifty-fifty principle; as for other East European countries, the Soviet Union has 90% and the UK (together with the USA) has 10% of total influence; As for Bulgaria the Soviet Union has 75% and other countries have 25% of total influence. In exchange for this agreed sphere of influence, Stalin gave tacit approval that the Soviet Union would not interfere in the Western Europe. As the two political leaders' agreement was also confirmed at the Yalta Conference in which President of the USA Franklin Roosevelt participated, this secret promise on their "turf" by the Great Power such as the USA, the UK and the Soviet Union was called the Yalta regime (Drulovic, pp. 31-32).

Next, situations in the former Yugoslavia which pursued the construction of unique self-managed

socialism after having experienced conflicts with the Soviet Union, Poland in its socialist period, the Hungarian Uprising in 1956 and Romania under the Ceausescu's rule are briefly explained.

Chapter 4 What was the Warsaw Pact Invasion of Czechoslovakia?

Democratization began in the early January 1968 when Aleksander Dubcek, a leader of moderate reform group in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, was elected the first secretary of the Party. As the abolition of censorship enabled literary magazines and newspapers to express their opinions actively the reform initiated by Dubcek came to get widespread support by many people. Such a situation was called the Prague Spring at that time. However, active democratization movement gained stronger momentum than Dubcek and his colleagues had expected, arousing suspicion by the Soviet Union and other East European countries. Finally, the Prague Spring was suppressed by the military intervention by Warsaw Pact countries.

At first the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union thought that military intervention could be justified if they get request for support by "Workers and Peasants' Revolutionary Government" as in the case of the Hungary in 1956 and that the reform in Czechoslovakia could be prevented.

The most positive toward the intervention were East German's leader Walter Ulbricht, Poland's leader Wladyslaw Gomulka and the first secretary of the Ukrainian communist party Petro Shelest who was also a member of the communist party politburo of the Soviet Union. They as well as leaders of adjacent areas in the Soviet Union were afraid of the spread of the reform movement in Czechoslovakia to their countries. Nikolai Podgorny, President of the Supreme Soviet and a member of the politburo, as well as military leaders were also positive toward the intervention. Among politburo members Prime Minister Aleksey Kosygin and Mikhail Suslov were negative toward the intervention. General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev was swaying between both groups. Tension between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union was relaxed after the meeting of leaders of both party held at Čierna nad Tisou (July 29-31) and the meeting of leaders of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (except Romania) held at Bratislava (August 3).

After August 7 most of the politburo members went for vacation. However, the military intervention was carried out on August 20. What happened during that time? There were following factors: Pressures from interventionists of KGB and military leaders; active approaches by Ulbricht and others; desperate efforts by conservative members of the communist party of Czechoslovakia to rally back; pressure from regional leaders of the communist party of the Soviet Union and leaders at the second echelon of the party apparatus, etc. A meeting of the politburo was held on August 16 at a urgent request by Shelest, who took care of the politburo during most members' absence. Based on a report submitted by Shelest, members of the politburo discussed situations in Czechoslovakia. Brezhnev, who was swaying till then, sided with interventionist, and at the meeting it was decided that

the military intervention should be done on August 20. In fact, on August 20 at 11pm in local time Warsaw Pact troops invaded Czechoslovakia. Due to a mistake in communication with the Soviet Union, the conservative group of the Communist party presidium of Czechoslovakia could not propose a resolution on “request for support”. By a majority vote, instead, the presidium adopted presidium’s announcement denouncing the military intervention. Alois Indra, a member of the central committee secretariat of the party, was supposed to become top of “Workers and Peasants’ Revolutionary Government”, but faced with strong passive resistance by people, none of conservative leaders could not announce himself as a person who requested for support. Valenta (1991) points out “contrast between militarily almost perfect execution of the operation and politically big mistakes”, and he calls into a question the quality of information which was sent to the Soviet leaders. The information from the route of the Soviet Embassy in Prague was biased.

The Soviet leadership succeeded in putting Czechoslovakia under its control by the military intervention and replacement of Dubcek with Gustav Gusak who carried out “normalization”, but The military intervention of Czechoslovakia was a foolish act which made an overwhelmingly large number of people the enemy, thereby the Soviet Union has lost the trust of Czechoslovak people. In the second half of the 1960s there was a renaissance of Marxist thought in West European countries, and “socialism with human face” in Czechoslovakia was attracting public attention in the world. However, the suppression of the reform in Czechoslovakia by force rooted out the possibility of democratic rebirth of the “existing” socialism, and the ideal of socialism became faded quickly.

Chapter 5 Why Has Socialism Collapsed?

1) Limitation of the Soviet-style Socialism

Causes of the collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union can be considered as follows:

(a) The Soviet-style socialism which was characterized by excessively centralized economic management had unreasonable challenges from the beginning. The planned economy which functioned well in the first phase of industrialization and the postwar economic recovery became unable to function well in a society where the economic structure was upgraded and people’s desire was diversified. As the kind of goods increases the volume of information that central planning offices have to process increases exponentially, therefore, the use of market mechanism was inevitable. Shiozawa (1998), a Japanese economist who converted from mathematical field, mentions an explosion of the time of calculation which increases in proportion of the N^{th} power of two. It is impossible for a central planning office (such as Gosplan) to calculate the volume of all products and the volume of resources to be allocated in advance taking into consideration distributive situations of disposable resources and forecast of demands. As Morita (2020) says, it is the wartime mobilization economy that existed actually in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. If people pursued higher level

of economic efficiency the scope of market mechanism could not be limited to the consumption goods but had to be extended also to the sphere of production goods and other spheres.

(b) If people pursued an economic reform further, it was inevitable that its effect would spill over into a political reform, but its move would come into conflict with the political system of one-party rule. It was unnatural that one party represented diversified interests of society.

(c) In the mid-1960s the Soviet Union and East European countries implemented economic reforms one after another. At that time it was necessary for Soviet leaders to overhaul the society thoroughly. In the 1970s Western countries, which had experienced oil shocks twice, pursued the development of energy-saving technology and microelectronics whereas the Soviet Union as an oil-producing country benefited from higher oil prices and neglected serious efforts in those spheres. East European countries, which were supplied cheaper oil from the Soviet Union, had no necessity to take the oil crisis so seriously.

(d) Heavy burden of huge amount of military expenditure. The Reagan administration of the USA, which was formed in 1980, started competition of military expansion. The Soviet Union was obliged to compete with the USA, but the Soviet Union, which was inferior to the USA in terms of economic power, gave up.

(e) The Soviet Union as well as East European countries could not cope with the advent of the era of information-oriented society. In the 1980s their delay in this respect compared with the West has become serious.

(f) The system of one-party rule restricted freedom and democracy. The desire of people who demanded freedom and democracy could not be suppressed for so long time.

(g) When Gorbachev visited Yugoslavia in 1988 new "Joint Belgrade Declaration" was announced. It practically negated "Brezhnev Doctrine" (= the theory of limited sovereignty), urging independence of East European countries and their democratization. This declaration was another expression of the internal workings of the Soviet Union which could no longer take care of East European countries in difficult situations. At first people in Eastern Europe took it only half believing. When they began to move for independence and democratization, however, there was no interference from the Soviet side. Consequently, movements for political reforms especially in Poland and Hungary accelerated.

(h) Socialism in Eastern Europe was a product of the Cold War. The end of the Cold War, i.e., the collapse of "Yalta regime" eliminated the necessity to keep East European countries in the Soviet block and maintain the Soviet-style socialism steadfastly.

I would like to add that also in Yugoslavia, which followed a path of unique socialism, socialism collapsed leading to disintegration of its federative state. It differed from the Soviet-style socialism in the point that it promoted decentralization of society, politics and economy with the principle of self-management applied to the whole society. However, it had a characteristic feature in common with the Soviet-style socialism, i.e., one-party rule. Due to this characteristic feature and the problem of self-management itself (i.e., inefficiency), the self-managed socialism in the former Yugoslavia could not escape from its collapse.

2) Reconsideration of the regime of one-party dictatorship and reconsideration of the Russian Revolution

The Russian revolution was different from one that Karl Marx supposed. In her letter to Karl Marx, Vera Zasulich asked about a possibility of the construction of socialism in Russia where rural communities remained strong-rooted. In his long and difficult letter, Marx's reply was positive. Although not explicitly, he suggested that socialism would be possible in Russia if taken together with Western capitalism. Soviet socialism was a unique socialism carved with Russian backwardness and Russian culture. Before the revolution workers occupied only several percent of total population while peasants occupied 80 percent. The literacy rate in Russia in 1917 was lower than that in France at the time of the French Revolution (1789).

In Tsarist Russia laws were not enacted by the parliament consisting of people's representatives but by Tsar himself. Suhara (2001) says that for common Soviet people the rules such as the laws were only distant ones to them like the state which enacted them. Such a situation is appropriate to the word law nihilism. This might have a connection with circumstances in which the culture of law related to the Roman law was not inherited to Russia.

In Tsarist Russia "upper strata" of the society and "lower strata" of the society were segregated completely. The nobility and intellectuals were immersed in Western culture (such as ballet, music, literary works, clothes, etc.) while many people in the low strata (most of them were peasants and workers) had livelihood distant to that. The parliament did not exist until 1905. Facing strong protest movement after the defeat of the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05), Tsar finally approved the establishment of the parliament. A half of members of the upper house was chosen by Tsar. The lower house (Duma) was opened, but soon it was dissolved by Tsar. The parliamentary system of government was nonexistent. Usually Tsar's favorite retainers became ministers. Liberalists requested "mandate cabinet" (enlightening bureaucrats who could get the public opinion's trust widely should become ministers) even if a cabinet responsible to the parliament was impossible.

The First World War was all-out war. Russia participated in the war, siding with Entente Powers (the UK and France). As the war prolonged Russia has become exhausted economically. In spite of people's growing war-weariness, the Russia continued the war. As a result, the February Revolution occurred in 1917, and the Tsarism collapsed all too soon. In this way amidst the First World War the democratic revolution occurred in Russia, but the Bolsheviks (later becoming the Communist Party of the Soviet Union) aimed for socialism further. As the expected revolutions in Western Europe did not occur, the Bolsheviks were obliged to construct socialism in one country. The October Revolution gave birth of a coalition government of the Bolsheviks and the Left SR, a peasant party descending from Narodniki, but this coalition lasted only for three months. The Left SR left from the coalition due to discord with the Bolsheviks over the problem of peace with Germany and rebelled against the government. It was suppressed by the Bolsheviks. Then the Bolsheviks faced the civil war (1918-20). After bloody battles against the White Army (Belaya Gvardiya), which was supported by foreign

troops, the Bolsheviks won victory finally. As a result, only one party, i.e., the Bolsheviks remained. The economy has become entirely exhausted. In the midst of the 10th Party Congress of Bolsheviks in March 1921 the Kronstadt rebellion occurred. This reflected serious dissatisfaction of peasants who had reluctantly supported the Bolsheviks till then. So, a major changeover from the Wartime Communism to NEP (New Economic Policy) was decided at the Party Congress. Being faced with this difficult situation, the Bolsheviks adopted the resolution on prohibition of factions. I take it as a resolution adopted in a way of emergency evacuation, but there are many people who do not take it in that way but as the universal organizational principle discovered eventually for vanguard parties. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union exported the organizational principles such as prohibition of factions and democratic centralism to communist parties around the world through the Comintern. Communist parties in China and North Korea, both of which came into conflict with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union subsequently, accepted these organizational principles and maintain them still now. These organizational principles, coupled with the one-party dictatorship, resulted in fusion, adhesion and integration of party and state³, which came to permit the emergence of Stalin's dictatorship.

Lenin was an intellectual who was familiar with circumstances in Western Europe, but as he was grown up in Russian legal culture, I think, he tended to think little of parliaments. When we read his works including *State and Revolution* we can find that Lenin glorified Soviet as Paris Commune-type organization in the following way: Different from bourgeois parliaments in which after an election once every four years representatives waste time talking about nothing in rest of the time, the soviet which is an organization to act also do decision-making. However, this idea is connected to the supremacy of the execution power (administration) over the legislative power (parliament). This point is problematic. The negation of the assembly for legislation of constitution is also problematic.

3) The Essence of Norkus' book

Zenonas Norkus, a Lithuanian historical sociologist, defines communism as follows: a social system appearing in Russia after 1917, and later spreading to other countries because of the effort to realize the communist utopia envisaged by Karl Marx (i.e. a classless society).

He says, if one posits that communism as a social system encompasses a) Marxist-Leninist ideology, b) a planned administrative economy, and c) a totalitarian or authoritarian political regime, one can then differentiate six models for existing communism, of which three are observed in real life: 1) China and Vietnam (retain a and c but drop; b) Most former republic of Soviet Union (retain c but drop a and b), and 3) Central Europe and the Baltic States (drop a, b, and c).

Norkus attaches importance to history of the communist world. According to him, the longest

³ Iwata (1994, p. 178) calls the regime established in this way "Marxist and Leninist party socialism", or more simply "party socialism". It consists of the vanguard which leads new society overcoming capitalism in a design-based way as the subject and the actor, and civil society (common people) as the rear-guard, objects and reactors.

totalitarian phase was in the USSR and it lasted from 1929 and to at least 1953. In most Central European countries this phase lasted only a few years (1948-1953). After this phase, we can observe an ever deepening internal differentiation in the communist world. The deepest differences were evident just before the collapse of communism. Norkus argues that this differentiation arose because the countries that belonged to the communist world were very different in their civilizational affiliation and their level of development prior to the advent of communism, and he mentions the following three types:

- a) bureaucratic-authoritarian communism: Czechoslovakia and East Germany.
- b) national communism: Hungary, Slovenia and Croatia. Poland was a mix of type a and type b.
- c) patrimonial communism: Bulgaria, Romania, and all of the former Soviet republics, with the exception of the Baltic countries.

Central and East European countries followed a path of capitalism after the system change, depending on foreign direct investment by the West. Norkus says that these countries were inserted into the world capitalist economy. The world capitalism is consisted of core, semi-core, semi-periphery and periphery. Baltic States and Central Europe are classified into semi-core, and Romania and Bulgaria in the Balkans are classified into semi-periphery. The positioning of Slovenia is subtle. Norkus classifies Slovenia into semi-core, but in other place of the same book he classifies Slovenia into core because of its smaller reliance on foreign capitals and its innovation-led economic development.

The above-mentioned argument by Norkus on societies after the system change, i.e. "... differentiation arose because the countries that belonged to the communist world were very different in their civilizational affiliation and their level of development prior to the advent of communism" seems to be quite natural when we hear it. However, I think that we have never heard about such an argument. In the light of this viewpoint the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 could be interpreted as a crash of the patrimonial communism, grown up in the Russian cultural climate, and the communism, grown up in Czechoslovakia which had experienced the parliamentary democracy.

4) Can we deny Soviet-style socialism totally?

In my view Soviet-style socialism fulfilled social welfare to a certain extent although there was a problem in its quality. I would like to present opinions of two economists. The late Professor Takumi Horibayashi (1951-2018) describes a Hungarian painter who said "If there was not Hungarian socialism a person like me, coming from a poor family, could not become a painter". Such a view contradicts with Janos Kornai's view about "a premature socialism". It seems that Kornai wanted to say that in spite of its poor ability Hungary (as well as other socialist countries) introduced the welfare system beyond its means.

Next, I will present an opinion of a Polish economist Marcin Piatkowski (Professor at Kozminski University) expressed in his book *Europe's Growth Champion: Insights from the Economic Rise of Poland*. His argument that communism was not a pure disaster but it laid the foundations for the

economic development of Poland after the system change is unique and very interesting. He puts an emphasis on institutions. Based on the analytical framework of Acemogle and Robinson (2013), he analyzes the Polish society from medieval times to contemporary times. The Polish Kingdom reached the peak of its power, and then it stagnated. In the second half of the 18th century it was partitioned by neighboring three powers and had finally disappeared from the political map in 1795. There has been a view that as the parliament composed by Szlachta (aristocrats) restrained the power of king the Polish kingdom was the most democratic country at that time in Europe, but the author stresses negative roles of Szlachta. They gave priority to their class interest over the national interest resulting in the intervention by foreign countries and the disappearance of their own country. According to him, the interwar Poland failed to develop its economy because it reproduced an extractive society not much different than that experienced during a long period of feudalism. Serfdom was gone, but feudal structures remained. In many ways the interwar Poland resembled the American South between the Civil War and the 1960s.

The most important legacy was not high level of welfare that it had brought, but the fact that communism removed feudal extractive social structures which had distorted the development of Poland (and of Central and Eastern Europe) for centuries. In the post-1945 communism replaced the old, pre-war elites, already much diminished during the War, with new elites, chosen mostly from among the downtrodden peasants and the blue collar workers. The new Polish communist government carried out thorough land reforms. In education, for the first time in Poland's history, the new communist government offered free, uniform, public, and compulsory primary education for all kids aged 7-15. Secondary education, in particular vocational education, has also greatly expanded. Improvements in access to tertiary education were revolutionary. Post-1945 Poland also experienced a historically unprecedented social mobility. He stresses that all these laid the foundations for the inclusive society after 1989 and for the subsequent appearance of the economic miracle unprecedented in history (Piatkowski, 2018, Chapter 3).

Although there might be problems in quality, the Soviet-style socialism tackled social welfare such as medical care, protection of children, pension, etc. and promoted education, culture, arts and sports and furthermore expanded opportunities for many workers to enjoy culture, arts, sports, etc. Novel and creative cultural and artistic activities which might lead to criticism of socialist system were often suppressed, but reproductive arts (such as performance of ballet, music, etc.) were greatly encouraged. Although sometimes distorted to enhance national prestige, sports were also greatly encouraged. As mentioned above, the Soviet-style socialism was greatly distorted and it caused many serious errors, but it cannot be denied totally, and it had some points which we should evaluate.

Chapter 6 Consideration of Ethnic Conflicts in the former Yugoslavia

At first we should consider the reasons for why the Yugoslav Federation was broken. First, a drastic

change in its international environment can be mentioned. In December 1991 the Soviet Union was broken. Although a socialist country, the Soviet Union was a hypothetical enemy for Yugoslavia. The threat of the Soviet Union disappeared. Germany and Italy, both of which had been great threat until the end of the Second World War, were no longer threat in 1990.

Second, the problem of one-party rule. There were the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (SKJ), which used to enjoy support by overwhelmingly majority of people, and its organization of united front the League of Socialist Workers. It became difficult for them alone to bring complicated and diversified interests of people together. Milovan Djilas (1911-1995), who was one of supreme leaders of the SKJ, emphasized the necessity for multi-party system in the newspaper Borba, then he lost the position and was jailed. In order for the Yugoslav Federation to survive, a country-wide political party organized across republics should have existed.

Third, people's common memory about the Second World War (invasion by foreign countries and joint fights against enemies) has faded. At the same time the consciousness of "Yugoslav citizen" was also gradually fading.

Fourth, the economic crisis, which surfaced in the end of the 1970s, prolonged. In spite of efforts to overcome the crisis, for example, the long-term program for the economic stabilization, etc., the economic crisis was further deteriorating, causing conflicts among republics and political crises. Thus the prestige of the SKJ, which was bringing various nations into a single federal state, was gradually declining.

Fifth, the international community accelerated the disintegration of the Yugoslav Federation from outside. Summit talks of political leaders of republics were held for several times from January 1991. Slovenia and Croatia requested secession or confederation of republics whereas Serbia requested the maintenance of the federation. The talks failed to reach an agreement. As the greatest common divisor of both claims was confederation the international community (Western Europe in particular) should have guided the former Yugoslavia in this direction. However, Germany, Austria and Vatican moved actively in the direction of the independence of northern two republics, accelerating the disintegration from outside.

Ethnic Conflicts after the Breakup of the Federation

In Bosnia and Herzegovina Serbs, Croats and Muslims (Slavic Muslims) lived happily together during the peace time. Here a subtle balance was kept among these three ethnic groups. This balance presupposed the existence of the Yugoslav Federation. Diplomatic recognition of Slovenia and Croatia by the EC countries including Germany from December 1991 through January 1992 broke the balance. Muslims moved toward its independence. However, there were efforts to avoid crash of Muslims and Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina until the final moment. For example, Adil Zulfikalpasic, a Muslim politician, repeatedly negotiated with Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina and arranged a written agreement, according to which both groups would make efforts to avoid a war, on July 13, 1992. Both groups were relieved and echoed with great joy at this news. On July 14 the day scheduled to sign the

agreement, however, the supreme leader of the Muslim group Alija Izetbegovic refused to sign turning the situation to the worst. He expected support by international Muslim groups and the USA and judged that Muslims would have a good chance of winning. Thus ethnic conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina became a bog⁴.

Kosovo War

For 78 days from March through June 1999 the NATO bombarded Serbia on the ground that Albanians in Kosovo were persecuted by Serbs. However, this was not such a simple problem as “persecution of Albanians in Kosovo by the Serbian security force”. Before that, in the 1990s an independence movement evolved in Kosovo. In the movement there were two groups. One was non-violence resistance course represented by Ibrahim Rugova’s the League for Democratic Kosovo (LDK). Another was an armed liberalization course of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA).

The LDK thought that it would be wiser to accumulate achievements of de facto rule through non-violent civil resistance (parallel apparatuses in the areas of education, medical care, taxation, etc.) and win other republics and the international community over to their side. In the first half of the 1990s the international community paid so much attention to ethnic conflicts in Bosnia while it paid almost no attention to non-violent civil resistance in Kosovo.

The KLA was founded in 1990. Since Kosovar Albanians were disappointed by the fact that the West neglected their “peaceful citizen’s protest” and did not support them, they thought that the freedom must be won by themselves and gradually came to support a more aggressive strategy. By September 1998 the KLA came to control 40% of the whole territory of Kosovo. Until around February 1998 the US government regarded the KLA as a terrorist group. In spring of 1998 the US government apparently made a volte-face in its policy for the Balkans and set about overthrowing the Milosvic regime. On May 8 in the same year the European Council of Foreign Ministers requested NATO’s military intervention.

Chapter 7 Historical Lessons and Future Society

The goal of the socialism in Russia was supposed to liberate people from tyranny of Tsarism, improve working conditions for workers, give lands to peasants and enrich workers and peasants. The soviet power faced various difficulties in the process of the construction of socialism. Among others the grain procurement crisis in 1929 was extremely serious. Despite opposition by leaders who put emphasis on cooperation with peasants Stalin made a great turn and carried out the collectivization of agriculture and industrialization with priority to heavy industry. Stalin played the similar role to that of Peter the Great. The socialism which was constructed quickly and aggressively in Russia where necessary

⁴ Such circumstances were explained in detail by Iwata (1999).

material, social and cultural conditions were non-existent was a twisted socialism which inherited characteristic features of Tsarism that Bolsheviks should have denied. Thus Leviathan has emerged. This Soviet-style socialism was planted to East European countries after the Second World War. Former Yugoslavia, which came into conflict with the Soviet Union in the process of construction of socialism, advocated self-managed socialism and in fact constructed a another type of socialism different from that of the Soviet Union in economic terms, but politically it had one-party rule. In this respect former Yugoslavia had something in common with the Soviet-style socialism. Different from the Soviet Union and other East European countries, former Yugoslavia was active in cooperation with Western countries. It was open socialism. However, the economic crisis, which surfaced in the end of the 1970s, deteriorated further causing conflicts among republics, finally resulting in the breakup of the Yugoslav Federation in 1991.

Until around 1990 many people (especially leftist) understood the revolution in Russia and the twisted socialism which emerged after the revolution as universal. They aimed at such a revolution and society, but it was a great mistake. I think it was inevitable to a certain extent because the information about serious mistakes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, for example, great purge in the Soviet Union in the 1930s, mass massacre of Polish military officers in Katyn forest, the purge of party leaders in Eastern Europe after the Second World War, etc. was only partially transmitted to the outside world. After the system change in Eastern Europe in 1989, Perestroika and the subsequent collapse of socialism and the breakup of the Soviet Union voluminous documents and materials became accessible to outside observers. It is quite important to analyze mistakes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. We and future generations can bring out precious lessons from them.

With the collapse of socialism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, there is nothing that can check on greedy managers' behaviors in the capitalist world. With this, neoliberalism which had already emerged in the early 1980s gained momentum. Greedy managers of companies have been pursuing immediate profit, wasting natural resources and destroying environment. Deregulation and taxation reforms (i.e. the reduction of maximum tax rate) made wealthier people more advantageous. Such reforms were justified by the "trickle down" theory, but the theory did not come true. Especially in Japan large enterprises have been increasing their internal reserves while their employees' wages have not been increasing as expected.

Future Society

The socialist revolution in Russia occurred not in peacetime but in wartime. In addition, Tsarism had enormous power while parliamentary democracy was not rooted yet. So, it might be justified to a certain extent that the soviet led by Bolsheviks used force to seize power in Russia. However, such a conduct is not permissible and impossible in capitalist countries in which the parliamentary democracy has been developed in the 21st century. If socialism would emerge in developed capitalist countries in future it would appear on the basis of the accumulation of democratic reforms through parliaments.

Marx' thought gave rise to the tide of Leninism in Russia on the one hand. It also gave rise to the

tide of social democracy in Western Europe on the other hand. This tide had influence on welfare state in Nordic countries and co-determination system in Germany, etc. I think it is necessary for us to learn positive aspects of experiences in these countries.

As for future society, in the same way as Horibayashi (2016), I think it unnecessary to put particular emphasis on the word such as means of production. I do not have a clear vision of the future society now. However, I envision not a society where greedy managers are left uncontrolled but a society where there is a certain social control over enterprises by stakeholders including employees and regional society, etc. I think that the roles of managers are important and that they should be paid according to the importance of their duties, but their pays will not be so high as hundreds times of the average wage of employees. At the level of regions policies that “nobody shall be left behind” will be necessary. There should be a state and regions which could provide all people with fulfilling social welfare. As for socialism, Horibayashi (2016) envisions a society in which non-profit organizations, which aim at people’s social solidarity as their direct purpose, occupy a great share of the society, and he says that the path to it will be “a series of process difficult to draw lines between “contemporary capitalism, better capitalism and socialism” (p. 504). We had better have various discussions about a future image of socialism. Welfare society and co-determination in Germany, etc. shall be taken into consideration. Global efforts to regulate tax havens and realize financial transaction tax are needed. Efforts for the environmental protection and especially countermeasures against the global warming are of urgent necessity. Finally I discussed the importance of efforts for gender equality.

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