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A village in Transylvanian mountains, Romania (May 9, 2009) ©Yoji Koyama



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Emigration from New EU Member States in Central and East European Countries

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Abstract

Since system changes in 1989-1991 Central and East European countries (CEECs) have experienced massive social changes. After having discussed that although CEECs tend to be regarded as post-communist capitalism unanimously in reality there are various types of capitalism, the paper examines problems of migration. Migration studies so far have suffered from 'host country's bias'. Only very few studies have analyzed problems on the part of sending countries. This paper analyzes the problem from a perspective of sending countries of emigrants. As people in new EU member states in CEECs became able to work in the EU's single labor market, it is natural that the number of workers who came from CEECs and work in advanced EU member states increased. The number of emigrants from Central Europe and Slovenia is numerous, but at the same time the number of immigrants is also numerous. Therefore, their populations have been stable. However, emigration from Latvia and Lithuania in the Baltics and Romania and Bulgaria in the Balkans has been proceeding at an excessively rapid pace, causing serious depopulation in these countries. Especially serious is the outflow of highly qualified workers such as medical doctors, nurses and IT engineers giving negative influences on these countries' economic development and social stability.

Keywords: EU, Central and East European countries (CEECs), Emigration, Post-Communist Capitalism, Core, Periphery

JEL Classification: J61, O54, P51, F22

> "In rural areas there is everything necessary for a people's life. There are houses, lands and foods. Only thing lacking is money." (Professor Manole Velikanu, Romania)
>
> "We had goats too but there are no longer any people to act as shepherds. Our grandchildren are already foreigners." (An old man staying in a Bulgarian village)

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Introduction

The Single European Act, entered into effect in July 1987, stressed the fundamental principle of four freedoms of mobility, i.e. freedom of mobility of goods, service, capital and labor. This principle was enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty, entered into effect in November 1993. The European Union (EU) has promoted the internal free and unrestricted movement of people in the member states by introduction of the EU citizenship and formation of the so-called Schengen Area which abolished their internal borders. However, free movement is limited to the people living in the EU, and immigration of people outside the EU has been controlled (Kamijoh, 2005, p. 52).

Although on a small scale, there had been immigration to the Western Europe from Southern Europe and other regions from old times. It is after the end of the Second World War that the movement had become a full-scale flow. The European integration had to be promoted in parallel to the reconstruction and development of the economy, which was destroyed during the war. However, there was a severe shortage of labor power in the Western Europe. France relied on labor power mainly from the Maghreb (Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco), and Germany relied on labor power from Turkey. Other countries in the Western Europe also relied on labor power from non-European countries. At first it was a general way that men came alone to Europe for jobs and sent money to their families living in their own countries. Such a pattern was due to the structure of their ties with families and relatives in their own countries as well as circumstances of poor housing in host countries. With the first oil shock in 1973/74 as a turning point the host countries decided to stop accepting new foreign workers (except new workers from the EC member states) because of worsening employment situations. Such a decision caused migrant workers to confirm their will to settle in the host countries instead. They did so after having judged that once returned home there would be no chance to visit Europe as migrant workers again. Miyajima (2010) explains this point as ‘a paradox of intention and result’ if we say in a Weberian way[2]. Since then, the number of families brought over from their own countries to Europe has increased. Thus, people coming from non-European countries and their children born in Europe came to settle down in Europe. These people with various cultural and religious background are now EU citizens.

In Central Europe as well as South Eastern Europe [the Balkans] movements for system change and democratization, symbolized by the Fall of Berlin Wall in 1989, occurred one after another. Also in the Soviet Union, in the course of Perestroika movements by Baltic people for self-determination became active leading to the independence of the Baltic States in September 1991. People in Central and Eastern Europe[3] strongly desired ‘Return to Europe’, which meant practically membership of the EC (the European Community, subsequently becoming the European Union). In the 1990s governments of these countries applied to the EU for its membership. Negotiation process began in 1997. Finally in May 2004, 8 countries from CEECs were admitted to the EU, followed by Romania and Bulgaria in

[2] Holifield (2017) explains the same point by using a phrase ‘liberal paradox’.

[3] Central and Eastern Europe = Central Europe + South Eastern Europe [the Balkans] +the Baltic States.

2007, and by Croatia in 2013. Thus, the EU came to be composed of 28 countries (since the BREXIT in 2019, 27 member states). After joining the EU, people in post-communist countries in CEECs became able to enjoy the right to free and unrestricted internal movement as EU citizens. In this way people's cross-border movement has become active.

Originally, I have been a specialist in area studies of Central and Eastern Europe with an approach of economic history. Since the latter half of the 1990s when post-socialist countries in CEE aimed at membership of the EU, I have been watching movements in it. This paper considers people's emigration from the EU peripheral countries and their depopulation and at the same time examines its implications for the European integration.

1 Massive Social Changes experienced by Central and Eastern Europe

For about 30 years from 1989 CEECs have experienced massive social changes, i.e., collapse of socialism in the Soviet Union, cession of Republics of the Soviet Union, disintegration of former Yugoslav Federation, independence and subsequent ethnic conflicts, transition to a market economy and economic reforms, accession to the EU and adoption of the euro, 2008 global financial crisis, etc. Therefore, it may sound a roundabout route, but I think that problems such as emigration from peripheral countries of the EU and their depopulation should be examined in the context of this massive social changes.

From 1989 to 1991 Jeffrey Sachs, a famous US economist, served as economic advisor to governments of Slovenia, Poland, Russia, etc. and acted as a mediator of these governments and the IMF. At that time transition countries such as CEECs and Russia suffered from a huge amount of debt and were obliged to get financial support by the IMF and the World Bank. According to Soko Tanaka (2007), the EU extended financial support to CEECs in the form of PHARE program, EIB (European Investment Bank) loans, etc., but the amount of these supports was small. The EU did not have forces of compelling system changes like the IMF. To classify the period in view of institutional reforms, the period from the system change to 1997 was led by the IMF and the period from 1998, when accession negotiations began, onwards was led by the EU (Tanaka, et al., 2011, p.35).

Immediately after the system change there were many people who dreamed of capitalism of Nordic type in CEECs[4], capitalism of Nordic type was not on the menu (Gowan, 1995). The influence of the IMF was so enormous that Western commercial banks never gave loans to post-socialist countries unless the IMF decided as such even if the amount was not so large.

As a member of study group, Alice Amsden, a US specialist of East Asian economies, made a field survey in the early 1990s and said that East European countries were involved in "moral crusade of market fundamentalism" (Amsden, et al, 1994). According to her, a significant difference between

[4] A Hungarian economist (Laszlo Szamuely), whom I interviewed in spring 1991, said, "we aim at capitalism of Nordic type".

classic capitalism, which Eastern Europe tried to promote, and late-industrializing capitalism in East Asia is the role of state and institutions. Institution building refers not just to the establishment of clear property rights and contracts law but also to the creation of private and public organizations capable of carrying out expansionary macroeconomic policies as well as investment, trade, competition, and technology policies, all operating under the umbrella of what has loosely come to be called industry. The role of the state in the economy was completely neglected in Eastern Europe.

The conditionality, which were conditions for the IMF loans, was based on prescription of neo-classic market fundamentalism. The prescriptions, which became known as the Washington Consensus (Williamson, 2003), can be summarized as follows:

1. Fiscal discipline;
2. Reordering public expenditure priorities from non-merit subsidy to basic healthcare, education, and infrastructure;
3. Tax reform that would combine a broad tax base and with moderate marginal tax rate;
4. Liberalization of interest rates, which would lead to substantially positive interest rates decided by market;
5. A competitive exchange rate;
6. Liberalization of foreign trade;
7. Liberalization of inward foreign direct investment;
8. Privatization of state enterprises;
9. Deregulation;
10. Property rights.

The IMF attached importance on speed. The reason was to bring the process to the point of no return. Neoliberalism has been negative toward the role of the state in transition to a market economy. Sachs as well as economists at the IMF considered the transition very easy. This is clear from Sachs' description "markets spring up as soon as central planning bureaucrats vacate the field" (Sachs, 1993, p. xiii). In reality, however, the role of the state was quite important.

Methods adopted in transfer of large state-owned enterprises to private ownership varied depending on countries. Among people who were thrown into a market economy after lengthy socialist period almost nobody has accumulated money enough to purchase an enterprise. If governments wanted to implement the privatization of state enterprises, there was almost no way other than giveaway sales of enterprises using vouchers (i.e., privatization checks) or sales to insiders (sales of shares with priority given to employees and managers) or foreign investors. The Czech Republic and Slovakia launched voucher privatization in December 1992. Hungary and the Baltic States chose a way of sales to foreign investors. Slovenia was able to implement privatization with priority given to insiders against negative opinions of the IMF since the country's state budget and current account balance were not in serious situations at that time.

In the socialist period the number of people engaged in agriculture was very numerous in CEECs, especially in Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, etc., but the number has substantially decreased in parallel with transition to a market economy. The World Bank played an important role in reforms in the area of agriculture, but advices by specialists of the World Bank did not necessarily fit the actual situations in regions[5]. Generally speaking, industry, especially heavy and massive industry was attached importance in these countries also in the socialist period, but after the transition to a market economy, reflecting increased significance of services its share in the economy has been decreasing gradually. In contrast, the significance of transportation and communication has increased. Drastic changes in the economic structure caused people's massive migration within and outside a country.

As for the banking sector, the socialist countries except former Yugoslavia had the mono-banking system, in which state banks such as Gosbank in the Soviet Union played not only functions of central bank but also functions of commercial banks. In Central and East European countries, however, from the terminal stage of the socialist period to the early stage of transition to a market economy the two-tier banking system with many commercial banks operating under the central bank was established. At the same time, many foreign banks entered these countries, expanding their networks of branches. Most of newly appeared commercial banks had collapsed by the end of the 1990s. They were obliged to become affiliated with west European banks. The share of foreign-owned banks in the total assets of banking sector in Central and East European countries except Slovenia exceeded 50% as of 2007. In some countries like Slovakia, Estonia and the Czech Republic the share is nearly 100% (Table 1).

Table 1 The share of foreign-owned banks in the total assets of banking sector in CEECs

Country	(%)
Slovakia	99.0
Estonia	98.7
Czech Republic	97.6
Lithuania	85.3
Hungary	84.5
Poland	75.8
Latvia	66.6
Slovenia	about 40

Source: Banincova (2012), p. 11. Data about Slovenia is added by Koyama.

[5] This point is explained more in detail by Koyama (2022a) based on cases in the Baltic States.

In the mid-1990s CEECs concluded the European Agreement with EU one after another and gained positions of associated member. Since then, these countries received pre-accession assistance from the EU until their full membership. As new EU member states from CEECs attained rapid economic development owing to their own effort as well as assistance from the EU and foreign direct investment (FDI), economic gaps between new EU member states and advanced EU member states has been narrowing.

Institute of World Economy at the Warsaw School of Economics is publishing Poland Competitiveness Report which shows the extent of convergence of new member states with the average of the EU-15 (see Table 2). In the table the level of economic development is expressed by per capita GDP at purchasing power parity (PPP). The table shows that although all CEECs have experienced transformational depression more or less they attained rapid economic development since the mid-1990s narrowing the gap between both. Although all new EU member states except Poland experienced negative growth by the global financial crisis after the Lehman shock in 2008, they resumed economic growth further narrowing the gap.

Table 2 Changes in Relative Development Levels of New EU Member States from Central and Eastern Europe (GDP per capita at PPP, Average of EU-15 = 100)

	1989	1992	2000	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2015	2017	2018
Estonia	54.2	36.1	36.8	48.5	57.1	61.3	57.9	67.7	70.0	70.1	73	75
Latvia	52.3	29.4	31.2	41.1	49.1	53.9	47.8	55.5	58.8	59.2	63	63
Lithuania	55.3	40.5	33.6	44.2	49.6	56.4	54.5	64.0	69.4	69.9	73	75
Poland	38.2	31.6	40.5	43.3	44.6	49.0	56.2	60.1	62.5	63.7	65	67
Hungary	55.8	44.3	46.2	54.5	55.4	56.9	59.0	59.8	62.5	63.7	64	65
Czech Republic	75.2	61.4	61.9	69.3	71.9	73.5	73.6	75.0	78.1	79.6	82	83
Slovakia	59.2	43.4	42.5	49.8	55.4	64.2	66.3	68.3	70.6	72.0	71	73
Slovenia	74.0	55.7	68.0	75.3	76.3	80.4	75.3	74.4	76.3	76.4	78	80
Bulgaria	46.6	34.2	24.3	30.3	33.9	40.2	40.4	42.1	43.1	43.3	47	48
Romania	34.0	25.0	21.9	29.4	33.9	43.6	44.9	49.4	50.6	51.6	58	60
Croatia	50.8	n.a.	42.1	49.8	51.8	56.9	53.4	54.9	54.4	54.1	57	58

Source: *Poland Competitiveness Report 2016*, p. 38; For 1992, *Poland Competitiveness Report 2006*, p. 20; For 2016, *Polish Competitiveness Report 2018*, p. 20. As for the period 1989-2015 *Competitiveness Report* expressed the value of Poland as 100, but Koyama revised all values by recalculation with the value of the average of the EU-15 being 100.

It is natural that people migrate from poorer CEECs to advanced EU member states, but I wonder until when such migration continue. According to the classic theory, the migration process stops when payments for work are equal in both sending country and host country (Pociovalisteanu, 2012). Indeed, emigration is an economic phenomenon, but as non-economic factors such as people's special attachment to their regions where they were born and grew up, human connection there, larger and comfortable living space, fresh air, less polluted nature, etc. affect their decision-making I do not think that migration continues until payments for work in advanced countries and less developed countries becomes equal. International migration studies so far tell us the following: Since people who intend to emigrate must prepare funds covering costs of long-distance travel by themselves, the poorest people cannot afford to emigrate, and it is richer people that emigrate in the less developed countries. Networks of friends and relatives who have already emigrated to advanced countries play important roles in emigration (Hatton and Williamson, 2005).

When researchers consider international labor migration, push-factors (poverty, unemployment, worse working conditions, etc.) in sending countries and pull-factors (higher wages, higher living standard, better employment opportunity, working conditions beneficial to improvement of skills, higher level of welfare, etc.) in host countries are often taken into account. Generally speaking, it can be said that poverty and limited opportunities for employment, etc. in peripheral countries in the EU are affecting as push-factors. However, as there is a significant difference in emigration among countries with similar income level, I think it necessary to examine actual situations in individual countries and consider causes of emigration more concretely.

Paul Collier (2019), who have been studying “a billion people in the lowest strata” of the world for long years, argues about “dysfunctional social model”. His argument suggests me to consider whether or not peripheral countries of the EU have such a factor affecting as a push factor more or less. I think I had better take into account such circumstances.

According to Saskia Sassen (1992, 2004), enterprise headquarters making decisions on foreign investment and overseas management have been intensively located in mega cities by globalization, the role of mega cities have increased, causing an enormous gap between these mega cities and other cities, regions, countries, etc.in abilities of making profit and earning income. She looks people’s migration in such a global structure. In her later work (Sassen, 2017) she calls into question ‘oust’ from the actually-working system of economy and society. She gives an example of an increase in eviction due to insolvency of mortgage in countries which were imposed fiscal restraint after the global financial crisis (Latvia is the highest in the percentage of seizure in Europe).

In addition, the following two approaches are important. First, Finnish and Lithuanian researchers[6] analyze problems of emigration from the Baltic States by using the analytical framework ‘exit, voice and loyalty’ of Albert Hirschman (1970) and show factors driving people to emigrate in a persuasive way. Emigration as ‘exit’ seems to have fundamental similarity with ‘oust’ that Sassen says. Second, a Slovak researcher Lucia Kurekova (2011) analyzes CEECs from a perspective of social welfare and discusses problems of emigration in a persuasive way.

Let us confirm what kind of economies were created in CEECs by system changes, transition to a market economy and accession to the European Union before we examine problems of emigration.

2 Characteristics of Post-Communist Countries in Central and East European

[6] Fox example, the following works: Sippola (2011, 2013, 2017), Woolfson (2010), Genelyte (2018).

Countries

Post-communist countries are not uniform. These countries had similar characteristics to a certain extent immediately after the system change, but then these countries have had a tendency to diverge. Aslund (2020) analyzes transition of post-socialist countries from a standpoint of neoliberalism. His argument is monotone because he argues privatization of state enterprises at the fastest speed and deregulation and gives only negative evaluation to countries which implemented gradual reforms[7]. However, actual post-socialist countries are diverse. It is necessary for us to explain the diversity and its origins carefully.

A Viewpoint emphasizing Civilization to which Countries belong before Communism

A Lithuanian Historical Sociologist Zenonas Norkus (2012) emphasizes history when he examines post-communist countries. He argues, "This differentiation arose because countries that belonged to the communist world were very different in their civilizational affiliation and their level of development prior to the advent of communism" (p. 32). Based on a study by Kitschelt, et al. (1999), he mentions the following three types:

1) Bureaucratic-authoritarian communism. In countries such as Czechoslovakia and East Germany that were economically, socially, culturally, and politically modern on the eve of the imposition of communist rule (which meant that they were industrialized, urbanized and that their inhabitants were universally literate and had personal memories of life under liberal democratic conditions) totalitarianism was transformed into this type of communism.
2) National communism. Governments in the countries of this type did not suppress the oppositional elements in society as ruthlessly as governments in the authoritarian communist countries. The governments would seek compromise; in exchange for apolitical passivity they guaranteed certain civil rights and refrained from assuming total control of all spheres of social life. Certain spheres were left alone (usually ones connected to national heritage and the promotion of "folk culture"). The example includes Hungary, Slovenia and Croatia. Poland was a mixture of bureaucratic-authoritarian and national communism.
3) Patrimonial communism. In those countries where modernization had not yet got underway (or was just barely underway) when communism was beginning to become entrenched, communism became their (turbo-modern) path to modernity; it transformed itself into patrimonial communism after its totalitarian phase, where particularistic networks of patrons and clients took over the most important roles of social organization. Bulgaria, Romania, and all of the former Soviet republics, with the exception of the Baltic countries are included in this type.

Norkus assigns Serbia and Slovakia to the mixed national-patrimonial category. He thinks that Estonia and Latvia had more similarity to the late communist strain that existed in Czechoslovakia and East

[7] See Koyama (2023).

Germany, i.e. bureaucratic-authoritarian communism. Lithuania was delayed in modernization compared with Estonia and Latvia, and therefore the country was mixture of national communism and patrimonial communism. However, with industrialization and urbanization in the 1960s its society became more modernized, and the country became closer to the type of other two Baltic countries (pp. 38-42).

Typological Explanation

In recent years there have been an increasing number of studies which emphasize role of institutions in the economy. In the early 21st century two noteworthy works appeared: One is a book edited by Hall and Soskice (2001), *Variety of Capitalism* (VoC), which considers capitalism by classifying it roughly into Liberal Market Capitalism (LME) and Coordinated Market Economy (CME). Another is a book written by Amable (2003): *Diversity of Capitalism* (DoC), which identifies 5 coexisting models, i.e., Anglo-Saxon mode; Social-Democratic model; Continental European model; South European (Mediterranean) model; and Asian model. The above-mentioned two works gave significant influences on later studies. However, Norkus (2012, p. 20) says that VoC theory was constructed to express differences countries which were in the frontiers of technological progress and that it is questionable to apply this to post-communist countries (former Soviet Union and East European countries) which have experienced system changes from 1989 to 1991 and are following ways to capitalism. Similarly, a Polish group led by Ryszard Rapacki (Rapacki, ed, 2019) says that as post-communist capitalism is composed of components which were transplanted from various institutional elements coexisting in contemporary Western capitalism it can be called patchwork capitalism and that VoC theory cannot be applied to CEECs. Below I will present the essence of works which explains the places of new EU member states from CEECs in a persuasive way.

A Study by Bohle and Greskovits

Bohle and Greskovits (2012) classify CEECs into several groups: the Baltic States as 'a pure neo-liberalism'; Visegrad countries (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia) as 'imbedded neo-liberalism'; Slovenia as 'neo-corporatism'; and Romania and Bulgaria as 'neoliberalism' similar to the Baltic States. The criterion which distinguishes these groups is the level of welfare expenditure. When we see total expenditure to social protection as a percentage of GDP in the period 1989-1995 it was on average 15.5% in the Baltic States, 21.1% in the Visegrad countries, 24.6% in Slovenia, and 15.5% in Romania and Bulgaria. In this way, intervention of the economy by the states has been restrained to as low level as possible based on the principle of neoliberalism in the Baltic States. A Japanese researcher Horibayashi (2014) explains this point as follows: "The strongest motive which determined national strategies for the creation of capitalism in the Baltic States was preservation of the independence and, in this connection, radical breaking off of the past. For this purpose, these countries chose the model which was farthest from the economic system of the former Soviet Union and which international financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank – under strong influence of the USA – recommended strongly". In contrast, in the Visegrad countries, different from the Baltic States, the heritage from the socialist period (relatively considerate social welfare) has been preserved, and neoliberalism has been "imbedded in society". Slovenia had rather active trade unions with mobilization ability, inheriting the tradition from self-managed socialism. Therefore, a mechanism of social dialogue and coordination of interests by representatives of business associations, trade unions and the government was formed after the system change[8].

According to Norkus (2012, pp. 110-112), The new EU members include two clear extremes: Estonia as the most market-oriented state and Slovenia as the most clear-cut case of strategic coordination. Other new EU members are in-between, with Lithuania close to neo-liberal Estonia, and Visegrad countries involving countries moving to LME states among the older members of the EU. Norkus (2012, p. 20) says that one can discover in the Baltic capitalism many features which VoC theory includes into the definition of LME: low workers unionization, pluralist adversary interest group, low employees organization, skills formation system focused on general (transferable) skills. However, he says, these similarities do not validate the classification of Estonia or other Baltic States as instances of LME as classified in the original VoC theory. The reason is the absence of liquid, deep and vigorous financial markets which richly supply venture capital and supervise managers of public corporations in the full-blooded liberal market economies. So, an argument for the existence of the third type of market economy now has a positive sense.

Dependent Market Economy

Nölke and Vliegenthart (2009) take up Central Europe[9] composed of Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia for an examination and discuss Dependent Market Economy (DME). They think that these four countries will converge on neither CME type nor LME type and that they will not become a crossbreed or hybrid combining characteristics of both types. Instead, they advocate to call these four countries the third type of capitalism, i.e. Dependent Market Economy (DME).

They have been influenced by 'Dependency' theory in the study of Latin America. According to them, reasons for why multinational enterprises entered Central Europe in a full scale were the existence of many skilled workers with knowledge of middle level techniques in this region and cheaper labor costs. Main means of investment funding is direct investment and loans from foreign-owned banks. The share of foreign ownership in three strategically important sectors such as automobile, manufacturing and electronics is overwhelmingly high (Table 4).

There is strong institutional complementarity between the FDI dominant ownership structure and the corporate governance structure. Main decision-making of enterprises is negotiated between subsidiaries in Central Europe and headquarters in the West. Subsidiaries are incorporated into

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[8] See Koyama (2018a) for Slovenia's experience.

[9] In their book the authors call "East Central Europe" denoting Eastern part of Central Europe.

international networks, and corporate strategies adopted in headquarters give decisive impact on Central European regions as a whole. As for industrial relations their viewpoint is unique. They say that economies in the Central Europe are not LME nor CME. Unlike the Anglo-Saxon model, Central Europe does not have culture of employment and dismissal. However, as there has been fierce competition for FDI and a threat that if things do not go well firms might be relocated further to east, workers' position is rather weaker than in CME.

Table 3 Three Types of Capitalism

Institution	Liberal Market Economy (LME)	Coordinated Market Economy (CME)	Dependent Market Economy (DME)
Distinctive coordination mechanism	competitive markets and formal contracts	interfirm networks and association	dependence on intrafirm hierachies within transnational enterprises
Primary means of raising investment	domestic and international capital markets	domestic bank lending and internally generated funds	foreign direct investments and foreign-owned banks
Corporate governance	outsider control/ dispersed shareholders	insider control/concentrated shareholders	control by headquarters of transnational enterprises
Industrial relations	pluralist, market based; few collective agreements	corporatist, consensual; sector-wide or even national agreements	appeasement of skilled labour; company level collective agreements
Education and training system	general skills, high research and development expenditures	company-or industry-specific skills, vocational training	Limited expenditures for further qualification
Transfer of innovation	based on markets and formal contracts	important role of joint ventures and business association	intrafirm transfer within transnational enterprise
Comparative advantage	radical innovation in technology and service sectors	incremental innovation of capital goods	assembly platforms for semi-standardized industrial goods

Source: Nōlke and Vliegenthart (2009), p. 680.

Multinational enterprises dislike corporatist complicated negotiation procedures, and if any strikes occur it would cost a lot as local firms are included in complicated global commodities chains. Consequently, multinational enterprises pay attention to keep their workers in quite satisfactory conditions and pay higher wages to skilled workers. As for educational system and training system, multinational enterprises usually do not want additional costs in on-the-job training of inexperienced young workers. Here public vocational training outside firms is dominant. Tough works such as R&D are carried out in LME and CME in western core regions, and their results are transferred to workplaces in Central Europe. Consequently, Central Europe has a competitive advantage in the assembly of half-standardized products.

Table 3 Share of Foreign Ownership in 3 Strategically Important Sectors (%)

Country	Automobile	Manufacturing	Electronics
Czech Republic	93.1	52.6	74.8
Hungary	99.2	60.3	92.2
Poland	90.8	46.2	70.3
Slovakia	97.3	68.5	79

Source: Nōlke and Vliegenthart (2009), p. 683.

Also Norkus adopted the concept of DME advocated by Nölke and Vliegenthart (2009). According to Norkus, this concept applies not only to Central Europe but also the Baltic States, but there are some differences. The type of DME represented by the Central Europe is Weberian-Poterian capitalism while those represented by the Baltic States is Weberian-Friedmanian capitalism (Figure 1)[10].

Figure 1 Lineage of Several Types of Post-Communist Capitalism



Source: Front cover of Norkus (2012)

The economic policy of the Visegrad states was oriented to attract high-quality investment to upgrade existing industrial bases and cluster them in the regions, attempting to embed them in the local economy and create spill-overs. This management follows a Poterian logic competitiveness which is achieved

[10] In Figure 1 REC is the abbreviation of Rational entrepreneurial capitalism.

from the high and rising levels of labour productivity associated with high-tech production processes and the intensive use of highly qualified labor. Under Porterian DME the maintenance of macroeconomic stability ranks second after industry modernization, and social inclusion is quite important, even if it is expected to be achieved not by means of redistributive welfare state, but rather by those of disciplinary workfare regime. In the Baltic States the macroeconomic stability has precedence over industry upgrading, not to mention social inclusion. Norkus even calls this type "currency board" capitalism[11]. Monetary institutions had a central role in the economic system there. That is why the name of Milton Friedman (1912-2006; a Nobel Prize Laureate and Professor at the Chicago University), an incarnation of neoliberalism, is connected to this type of DME. Similar to Central Europe, also in the Baltic States FDI is attached importance.

Viewpoint Emphasizing the Modes of Countries' Integration into the Global Economy

Although their analysis includes all the post-communist countries including Central Asia and Russia, Myant and Drahokoupil (2011) emphasize the modes of the country's integration into the global economy. They mention 5 types which emerged among post-communist countries;

1) Market Economies based FDI
   They have attracted inward FDI actively and export products of manufacturing produced by multinational enterprises, but they occupy on the second-rank places in the international productive network. This type includes Central Europe and Slovenia.
2) Peripheral Market Economies
   They heavily depend on financialized development and overseas remittance and are not well prepared against external shocks. Their market conditions are a good reputation among international financial circles, but they are connected to a low level of provision of welfare services. This type applies to the Baltic States.
3) Oligarchic or Clientelistic Economy
   Business leaders put emphasis on exports of natural resources (petroleum and gas), steel and chemical products and are under the patronage of political leaders. Even major state enterprises behave like Russian private businesses and establish their subsidiaries operating in foreign countries and transfer profits from them to private individuals in order to get profits from exports. Russia as well as Kazakhstan and other CIS countries applies to this type.
4) Order State
   This type of countries implemented only the most limited reforms and applies to CIS countries. The authors of the book mention Belarus in particular.
5) Economies relying on Overseas Remittance and Assistance
   CIS countries and the Western Balkan countries fall under this type. If there is adequate environment

[11] Norkus says that at that time Latvia did not have a currency board as an institution, but it had a de facto currency board system, as its national currency Lats was pegged to foreign currencies basket and then to the Euro.

> for business, geographically good location and attractive infrastructure for companies doing work subcontracted by multinational enterprises the countries may be promoted to peripheral market economies, but as they lack such conditions for the time being most of domestic business activities remain at small-scale business. It is dispensable for people's survival to get overseas remittance and assistance from foreign countries and international organization.

New EU member states that I am studying in this paper do not fall under types 3 and 4. Slovenia has many things in common with Central Europe, but it is not so anxious for inward FDI, rather it is doing outward FDI. Taking into account that the country is following a path of innovation-led development as Norkus (2012) points out, it seems appropriate for us to classify Slovenia into a different category. Among the Baltic States Estonia is close to type 1. Latvia and Lithuania are peripheral market economies, but I am afraid that if things do not go well both countries might fall under type 5. Two Balkan NES Romania and Bulgaria have similar danger.

Positions of CEECs in the World Capitalism

Immanuel Wallerstein (2013) classifies regions composing the modern world system into three categories: core, semi periphery and periphery[12]. Norkus (2012) classifies the World Capitalism into 4 types: core, semi-core, semi periphery and periphery. He explains as follows:

> The core of world capitalist economy (the "top league") includes most capital-affluent and advanced postmodern countries on the frontier of radical or incremental technological innovation, where the highest added value production is concentrated. The semi-core includes modern countries with capabilities to manufacture products developed in the core, but which are still unable to automatically develop and organize (as intellectual property owners and marketeers) commodity chains to produce high-tech or branded products or provide related services. The semi-periphery includes countries with the skills and economic environments sufficient to produce semi-manufactures and simple manufacturing products of low added values. Low labor costs are key factor for international competitiveness of such products. The periphery countries are able to compete on the world markets as raw materials producers. If they are not endowed by nature, they survive by exporting labour force with emigrant remittances being as essential element for their international payments balance, and by foreign aid (p.112).

Bohle and Greskovits identify four types of countries depending on whether the exports are dominated by (1) heavy-basic, (2) light-basic, (3) heavy-complex, (4) light-complex production (p.112). According to Norkus, states that specialize in manufacturing (3) and (4) products are classified semi—core

[12] Wallerstein says that the modern world forms a structural body, which emerged in 'long 16th century' with Western Europe as core, Eastern Europe and as peripheries. From postscript by the translators.

countries. These are the Visegrad countries (Central Europe) and Slovenia. Countries specializing in manufacturing type (1) and (2) products are classified as semi-peripheric. Such countries include Bulgaria, which specializes in exports of type (1) products, as well as Romania and the Baltic States, which specialize in type (2) products (p. 113). Although, Norkus has a slightly different opinion, by and large he supports their classification. Among the Baltic States, Norkus evaluates Estonia positively, distinguishing this country from other two Baltic States.

It is Slovenia that is placed in a delicate position. As mentioned above, together with the Visegrad countries Slovenia is classified as semi-core countries which are specializing manufacture of types (3) and (4) products, on a different page of the same book Norkus gives Slovenia higher position. Although he says that as its GDP per capita in purchasing power standard was still below the EU average in the EU in 2009 (88%) it may appear dubious to classify the country into a world capitalism core country, he evaluates this country positively.

He says that the only post-communist country where REC is clearly evolving in a shape which is quite close to Nordic and continental capitalism (the paradigm cases of which are France and Germany) (p.113). This country is classified into CME (Coordinated Market Economy). According to him, Slovenia cannot be classified as a DME as the country's industry and financial sector are not dominated by foreign capital (p. 245). Most Slovenian firms still have internal owners. At the same time the country was able to join the international labour division system as an exporter of technologically complex production. It has many firms with their own brand of world-wide reputation. In 2010 Slovenia was the only post-communist country classified by the World Economic Forum as an innovation-driven state, and so considered as a world capitalist system core country[13] (pp. 245-246). He classifies Slovenia into a core of the world capitalism on the ground that it has innovation-driven state having advantage in the areas of electronics, chemicals (especially pharmaceuticals) and production of engines.

As we have seen, post-communist countries in CEECs have diversity, reflecting their civilizational affiliation and their level of development prior to the advent of communism. In this connection, a study by Bohle and Greskovits (20xx) who classify Slovenia as neo-corporatism is very persuasive. Norkus, who classifies the world capitalist economy into core, semi-core, semi-periphery and periphery, provides us with an important viewpoint. A viewpoint of 'Dependent Market Economy' advocated by Nölke and Vliegenthart (2009) applies well to all post-communist countries in CEECs except Slovenia. Myant and Drahokoupil (2011) emphasizing the mode of a country's integration into the global economy also

[13] By the 1965 economic reform former Yugoslavia adopted a market economy substantially within the framework of socialism and incorporated its economy into the world economy. As Slovenia in particular cooperated with Western countries actively and was able to absorb Western technology the technological level of its firms is high. For example, based on the Law of Joint-venture, Kolektor, a firm producing commutators (essential parts of an electromotor) began cooperating with a German firm, a leading firm in that area, in 1968. As Kolektor invested in R&D actively, absorbed technology earnestly from the German firm and made some refinements to commutators its technological level finally surpassed that of the German firm in the early 1980s. Kolektor became independent in 2002. As Kolektor has been concentrating a market niche it came to occupy the first place in Europe and the second place in the world, becoming a multinational enterprise.

provide us with an important viewpoint. As Norkus (2012) read all the studies mentioned above except Rapacki, et al (2019) and incorporates their essence into his theoretical framework, below I will examine actual situations of people's emigration from CEECs based on Norkus (2012).

3 Accelerated People's Emigration from CEECs

In the socialist period, except for former Yugoslavia, it was remarkably difficult to emigrate from CEECs to the Western world. Aside from political asylum and some exceptional cases, there has been almost no emigration to the West. After the system change prohibition of people's mobility was lifted. In the early 1990s emigration from post-socialist countries to the Western Europe began and the number of emigrants increased gradually. Around the time when the CEECs was officially admitted to the EU people's emigration from CEECs increased in full-scale. Figure 5 appeared in the World Bank report which reviewed the EU admission of 8 post-socialist countries as of 2005. To be honest, after having seen this figure, I began to examine problems of outflow of population from new EU member states in CEECs[14].

Figure 2 Job Applications in UK by People from EU-8 Countries



Around the time when the accession of CEECs was placed on the agenda, there was an anxiety that migrants from NMS would rush into old member states on a massive scale, giving destructive influence on the labor market. In 2002 the existing members of the EU (EU-15) decided that they might take transitive arrangements for nationals migrating from NMS (except Malta and Cyprus) to substantially limit their possibilities of work up to seven years. However, the UK, Ireland and Sweden, where their

14 I have published several papers on case studies in CEECs. See Koyama (2008), Koyama (2019), Koyama and Tomiyama (2019), Koyama (2020b), Koyama (2021), Koyama (2022 a), and Koyama (2022 b).

economies were in good shape, did not use this right and have immediately opened their labor markets. After the accession, labor migrants have concentrated to these countries.

The vertical axis of Graph shows the proportion of applications for work permits in the UK. The horizontal axis showing per capita GDP at ppp (the average of the EU = 100) in new EU member states from CEECs means that the further a country is placed from the coordinate origin the richer it is. From this figure we can find that the number of emigrants from richer countries was smaller while the number was larger from poorer countries. As shown by the fact that the number of emigrants was by far larger from Lithuania which was somewhat richer than Latvia, it seems that the number of emigrants is determined not only by poorness of a given country. It is not clear from this figure, but we can presume that a rapid pace of outflow of people causes depopulation of the country, especially its rural areas.

Table 5 Net Migration from New EU Member States in CEECs To EU-15 in the period 2000-2015

	Countries of Origin										
Destination	BG	CZ	EE	HU	LV	LT	PL	RO	SK	SI	合計
Denmark	4,945	938	1,041	2,329	3,775	7,967	21,472	12,006	1,227	274	55,974
Finland	1,850	-38	44,710	1,993	1,705	1,075	3,944	2,383	200	49	57,811
Ireland	893	2,681	1,215	6,062	13,105	22,588	86,857	14,399	6,554	123	154,477
Sweden	5,005	1,417	246	2,431	4,369	9,941	43,419	13,447	1,276	531	82,082
UK	46,697	29,786	7,418	43,445	61,914	112,647	644,354	82,023	62,684	1,106	1,092,074
Greece	34,395	738	69	156	296	378	334	19,882	456	23	56,691
Italy	47,291	4,728	990	7,837	2,564	5,066	75,481	902,877	7,723	-129	1,054,428
Portugal	4,390	111	-99	171	130	222	588	19,251	61	24	24,849
Spain	126,438	6,903	1,751	8,012	3,797	16,620	55,253	649,643	6,891	1,095	876,403
Austria	4,845	16,939	114	26,371	247	280	23,461	38,899	8,368	1,922	121,446
Belgium	25,401	3,142	950	5,090	1,746	2,327	61,806	54,801	5,873	882	162,018
France	7,614	-3,181	28	-3,717	1,396	970	-32,145	55,800	1,503	-978	27,290
Germany	72,117	442,672	2,571	83,854	17,722	33,320	1,259,480	267,267	18,409	13,578	2,210,990
Luxembourg	784	826	512	966	483	588	2,585	1,439	647	435	9,265
Netherland	17,064	-3,980	772	7,650	2,947	4,091	82,246	10,721	478	126	122,115
EU-15	399,693	503,682	62,288	192,590	116,196	218,080	2,329,135	2,144,838	122,350	19,061	6,107,913
Ratio to Population	4.89%	4.90%	4.55%	1.89%	4.90%	6.23%	6.09%	9.56%	2.27%	0.96%	

Source: Mara and Landesmann (2016), Free Movement of Persons to the UK and Its Implications for the Mobility of the EU-CEE Countries, wiiw, Forecast Report , Autumn 2016. The ratio to population is calculated by Koyama.

Table 5 was prepared by Mara and Landesmann at the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (wiiw) using various statistics of the UN. Their direct purpose is to consider the possible impact of Brexit on the mobility pattern of EU-CEE citizens headed to the UK. This table is useful also for our study because it includes advanced countries (EU-15) other than the UK as destination. However, we should be mindful when we look at this table. This table includes only net migration from new EU member states CEECs to EU-15. Migration to North America and other regions has been presumably massive, but this is not included in the table. Similarly, migration between new EU member states, for example migration from Romania to Hungary, has not been taken into account. Net migration from New

EU member states to EU-15 for 16 years from 2000 through 2015 amounted to about 6.1 million. The destination for which the largest number of people headed is Germany, and about 2.21 million people (about 36% of the total) left their own countries for this country. The second place is the UK (17.7%), followed by Italy (17.2%), Spain (14.3%). In countries following Spain the number of net emigrants is much smaller. It is very strange that France, a major power in Europe and the most tolerant country toward migration, has accepted a smaller number of emigrants from CEECs. I guess that France has accepted emigrants from Maghreb countries on an overwhelmingly large scale[15].

Next, in order to grasp relative scales of net migration from new EU member states, I have calculated the ratio of net migration to population by dividing the total net migration for each country in the period 2000-2015 by the population as of 2000 (the lowest row). We can find that Romania comes first with 9.56%, followed by Lithuania (6.23%), Poland (6.09%), Czech Republic (4.90%) and Latvia (4.90). Bulgaria follows the last two countries with a narrow margin (4.89%). It is noteworthy that in the case of Slovenia the percentage is the lowest (only 0.96%). In spite of the fact that people have migrated massively from Poland and the Czech Republic to the EU-15 any serous decrease in population has not occurred in these two countries because they have had massive immigration from foreign countries at the same time. Favorite destinations are somewhat different depending on countries of origin[16].

[15] I would like to add that I received precious comments from Mrs. Ljiljana Cabrilo Blagojevic, a doctoral student at the ECPD living in Paris, who read my draft paper. Her opinions can be summarized as follows: 1) France was the first European country of immigration, which started importing foreign labor at the end of the 19th century, which has been successively replaced since then, and most of them settled permanently in France; 2) as for immigrants from Africa, France has been accepting immigrants not only from Maghreb countries but also from sub-Saharan Africa; 3) although the acceptance of low-skilled foreign labor was prohibited after the oil shock of the 1970s, shortly after that, foreigners who remained living in France were allowed to be joined by their families, so that the number of foreigners increased; 4) France is one of the few countries in Europe that does not yet have a problem with the birth rate (yes, this is well-known, it was thanks to various efforts including government's policies. Y.K.). Therefore, the country is not yet forced to improve its demographics with more massive new immigration; 5) the import of illegal, mostly seasonal workers, is carried out as needed; 6) France is trying to turn to "selective immigration", so that it accepts highly qualified profiles, while putting up dams for low-skilled and unskilled immigrants. France accepts medical doctors mostly from Romania and Poland, and IT technicians – often from Maghreb countries. For medical doctors from non-EU countries, access to France, unlike Germany and the UK, is still very difficult; 7) France, with a large number of elderly people, needs low-skilled labor to help in the house and take care of children and the elderly, but Eastern European countries are also faced with the problem of aging, so in France these jobs are primarily covered by women from Maghreb, from the Philippines and Indonesia; 8) the unemployment rate in France is higher than in Germy, the UK and EU member states; 9) high national debt, high taxes (the highest in Europe), the feeling of falling living standards and increasing inequalities make France, perhaps, less attractive for Europeans than other developed EU member states. On the other hand, the standard of living in many Eastern European countries has approached that of Western EU member states, so that immigrants return to the countries of origin, according to Table 5, is most noticeable in France.

[16] For Romanians the most favorite destination has been Italy, followed by Spain and the UK. For Lithuanians it has been the UK, followed by Ireland, Germany and Spain, and its neighboring country Sweden has been ranked fifth. For Poles it has been Germany, followed by the UK, and the numbers of migration to other countries have been smaller by a digit. For Czech people it has been Germany, followed by the UK and Austria. For Latvians it has been the UK, followed by Germany and Ireland. For Bulgarians it has been Spain because the climate is mild there and agricultural labor in Spain has not required Bulgarian peasants to get any new skills. The second place has been occupied by Germany, followed by Italy, the UK and a neighboring country Greece.

From Poland and the Czech Republic numerous people emigrated to the EU-15. However, as also numerous people immigrated in both countries at the same time, any serious decrease in population has not occurred[17]. An EU report (2014) mentions numbers of net international migration (immigration – emigration). According to it, the net international migration was positive in four countries. The proportions of net international migration to the populations as of 1988 are as follows (in order of size): Czech Republic (6%), Hungary (4%), Slovenia (3%) and Slovakia (1%).

4 Importance of Viewpoint of Periphery

When we examine studies on international labor migration published so far in Japan (Okabe 2017, Sugimura 2017, Akashi 2020, Kastles and Millar 2011, Honda and Yamamoto 2019, Holifield 2017), we can find that an overwhelmingly large number of studies are considering host countries as center, for example, how to control immigration, how to make use of highly skilled workers, how to treat professionals (such as lawyers), how to integrate immigrants into the host society, multicultural coexistence and education of migrants' children, networks of migrants. emerging 'migration nation', etc.[18]

As Kurekova (2011) says, "migration studies have suffered from 'host country's bias'. Only very few studies have analyzed problems on the part of sending countries, and such studies account for only about 5% of all migration studies[19]. This paper pays attention to sending countries (countries of origin) for migrants.

In spite of more than 10 years of EU membership, some new member states could not and cannot provide their people with sufficient employment opportunities, causing massive outflow of people. I would like to call such a problem into question. Of course, people's emigration has positive effects, for example, it provides young people with opportunities to study abroad, contact different culture, interact with foreign people, etc. Overseas experiences will give other people opportunities to get new jobs appropriate fort them, or to enhance their career. Knowledge, skills and experiences gained in foreign countries will be useful for their mother countries after returning home. It is possible to a certain extent

[17] Poland has had over 40thoudands permanent immigrants every year from 2007 through 2013. The number decreased to 32,000 in 2014, but it increased to 86,100 in 2015. The number of permanent immigrants who flowed into the Czech Republic was 100,600 in 2007, and 76,200 in 2008. In 2009 after the global financial crisis the number decreased to 38,200 and the number continued at the 20,000 range for a while, then the number increased to 38,500 in 2014 and recorded 31,600 in 2015. OECD (2017), p. 17.

[18] Holifield (2017) discusses 'defense state' in the Westphalia system, then rise of 'foreign trade state' after the industrial revolution, and the birth of 'migration state' in the latter half of the 20th century. According to him, it [foreign trade state] has become increasingly depend on wealth of the state, power and stability, and its intention to take a risk for foreign trade and migration. He argues that clearly copying the US and Canadian ways, the EU established a new 'Blue Card' program in order to attract highly skilled foreign workers, becoming 'a migration state'. This is an interesting issue, and I admit that the EU has such an aspect, but I do not necessarily support all of his argument because I place my hopes on the possibility of the EU's polycentric development.

[19] An e-mail from Dr. Andras Innotai (Director of the Institute of the World Economy at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences) in November 2019.

that people who study and work in foreign countries settle there permanently. However, if the number of emigrants increase at too rapid pace and in addition a high percentage of the emigrants settle in destination countries its negative effects would be larger bringing serious difficulties to the mother countries, especially their provincial areas in the reproduction of society, the inheritance of culture, the preservation of national land, etc.

From 2004 through 2018 the population in Estonia decreased by 2.1% whereas it decreased in Latvia and Lithuania by 16.6% and 18.5% respectively. In the Baltic States the mortality rates exceed the birth rates, causing negative rate of natural increase continuously. Especially in Latvia and Lithuania massive emigration of their people has been the biggest factor causing a decrease in population. With the yearly average rate of decease in population being -1.2% since 2000 Lithuania is one of fastest shrinking countries in the world (Ubareviciene, 2017). Emigration has contributed to about 80% of the total decrease in population. There are people who call Lithuania's emigration "largest threat".

Table 6 Medical Doctors who came from or were trained in CEECs

	Countries of Origin										
Destination	BG	CZ	EE	HU	LV	LT	PL	RO	SK	SI	Total
Denmark (2005)	26	7	6	12	7	114	187	58	2	0	419
Finland (2005)	7	1	427	17	3	6	40	7	1	0	509
France (2004)	59	44	2	27	6	5	193	568	4	0	908
Germany (2005)	462	304	27	359	43	6	1,332	824	454	28	3,839
Ireland (2007)	0	46	2	59	6	8	155	0	43	2	321
Italy (2005)	0	0	0		0	0	207	389	0	9	596
Netherlands (2007)	2	15	1	27	1	2	131	16	9	1	205
UK (2007)	326	884	44	1,002	105	205	2,022	644	183	19	5,434
Total	882	1,301	509	1,503	171	346	4,267	2,506	696	50	12,231

Source: European Commission (2014), pp. 67-68. Original source is WHO (2009), p. 18.

The outflow of highly qualified workers, i.e. 'brain drain' has been a serious problem. Emigration of highly qualified workers such as high-tech specialists and medical workers to foreign countries has been continuing[20]. Table 6 tells us the following: First, the number of medical doctors who emigrated from CEECs to Germany and the UK is very numerous; Second, there is a tendency that emigration of medical

[20] Greece, which is of course not a Central Eastern European country, had a similar problem. As of 2017, 7,500 medical doctors had already emigrated from Greece to foreign countries. This country was obliged to accept international support due to the Greek crisis (2010). It was imposed austerity measures as a condition for the support by Troika (the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the IMF). Consequently, Greece was requested to curtail the medical costs and was obliged to cut wages of medical doctors and close public hospitals. Massive outflow of medical doctors was the result of the austerity measures (Onoue, 2017, pp. 69-71).

doctors has been concentrated on specific countries, for example, from Estonia to Finland, and from Lithuania to Denmark. Third, in terms of population Slovenia is a small country (about 2 million) is same as Latvia (about 2 million) and a little bit larger than Estonia (about 1.3 million), the number of medical doctors who emigrated is much smaller than these two countries.

As Romania has the fewest number of practicing medical doctors per capita in the EU, the medical brain drain has become an "issue of national concern" (Anghel, et al, 2016, p. 20). The number of Romanian physicians working abroad exceeded 14,000 as of 2013, representing a third of the county's total number of medical doctors (Paun, 2018, p. 4). Such a situation explains the poorest level which is reflected in the highest infant mortality in the EU. Low health satisfaction significantly intensifies young Romanians' intention to migrate abroad (Sandu, 2017, p.18). It would be nonsense to evaluate a country's economic growth by per capita GDP when population is decreasing in EU peripheral countries by rapid emigration in this way. I wonder whether majority of people living in the EU peripheral countries have become happy with the EU accession.

On the part of host countries, it would be problematic to accept excessively rapid inflow of immigrants. It takes a long time to integrate immigrants into the society of the host country. It is Paul Collier (2019), a British specialist on development economy engaging in migration study for long years, that gives a warning about rapid inflow of immigrants. He emphasizes the importance of identity. The sharing of identity, i.e. mutual sympathy will bring two kinds of act, namely a) transfer of wealth, and b) mutual aid, both of which are indispensable for society's prosperity. As these two exist the national insurance service has become possible. According to him, a high-income country has a well-functioning social model (consisting of the combination of state's institutions, rules, organizations) whereas a poor country has a dysfunctional social model. Emigrants are escaping from a country with a dysfunctional social model. Emigration of a middle degree is no problem. Remittance by immigrants to their mother countries plays an important role. By the inflow of immigrants, the society of a host country increases its diversity and gets stimuli, but at the same time the mutual sympathy among the people decreases, gradually making a) and b) difficult. The acceleration of migration is really a problem because immigrants may bring the dysfunctional social model into the host country. In fact, it a problem not only for the host country but also for the country of origin. It is the poorest people that have difficulty really because they are unable to leave the country. Emigration of richer people does not lead to real development of their countries of origin. Thinking in this way, Collier concludes that effective regulation by host countries is necessary. I agree with his opinion. I think that the present situation is that EU's peripheral countries suffer from depopulation while EU's rich core countries continue to absorb highly skilled workers whom the peripheral countries have educated and trained using public funds. I have a fundamental question whether such a mechanism is sustainable or not[21].

[21] Another problem connected to international labor migration is refugee problem. This became more serious in the EU especially after 2015. The most numerous have been refugees from Syria. As Morita (2020) also says, their emergence was a result of inadequate intervention in Middle East by Russia, the USA and the Western powers.

Conclusions

Let me summarize points that I have discussed. For about 30 years after the system change CEECs have experienced great social and economic transformation. For a certain period of time from the early 1990s the influence by international financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank was great. After 1998 when CEECs began accession negotiations with the EU the influence of the latter increased. Although these countries are called post-communist capitalism unanimously, after the system change it became evident that various type of capitalism have emerged reflecting their civilizational affiliation and their level of development prior to the advent of communism. CEECs have attained rapid economic development after the system change and especially after their EU accession narrowing gaps between themselves and advanced EU member states. However, there remain considerable gaps.

Transformation from socialist economies to capitalist market economies were accompanied by fundamental changes in their economic structure. Surplus labor powers which were pushed out from agriculture and heavy and massive industries needed their new places for work. Consequently, other than migration within a country, there emerged massive emigration to foreign countries.

Migration studies so far have suffered from 'host country's bias' (Kurekova, 2011). Only very few studies have analyzed problems on the part of sending countries. This paper analyzed the problem from a perspective of sending countries of emigrants. As people from new EU member states in CEECs became able to work in the EU's single labor market, it is natural that the number of workers who came from CEECs and work in advanced EU member states increased. The number of emigrants from Central Europe and Slovenia is numerous, but at the same time the number of immigrants is numerous. Therefore, their population has been stable. However, emigration from Latvia and Lithuania in the Baltics and Romania and Bulgaria in the Balkans has been proceeding at an excessively rapid pace, causing serious depopulation in these countries. Especially serious is the outflow of highly skilled workers such as medical doctors, nurses and IT engineers giving negative influences on these countries' economic development and social stability.

Being in dangerous situations numerous people from Syria, Afghanistan and other countries moved toward safer and richer EU countries, especially Germany and Nordic countries. Such movement has been affected by poverty. Other than refugees who left their mother countries for humanitarian reasons, there are economic refugees. The host countries have a limit of acceptance. Mencinger (2017) is rather positive about the acceptance of refugees. I hear that behind the scenes Turkish smugglers working as contractors of migration. I think that people, other than refugees who should be accepted urgently for humanitarian reasons, should be extended economic and technological assistances by the international community in order for them to stay and live a decent life in their mother countries. In addition, as Stiglitz points out, there are cases in which as crops which people cultivated previously could no longer be cultivated due to the global warming in Sub-Saharan Africa people left their home and move toward the EU. Russia's invasion of Ukraine, which began on February 24, 2022, generated massive refugees and displaced persons. The above-mentioned problems should be tackled and solved by the international community with all its strength. As these serious problems should be discussed separately, I do not discuss in this paper.

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